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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2628 
___________ 
 
LATIFULLAH OBEDULLAH, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A093-330-060) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy Harbeck 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 19, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: January 28, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Latifullah Obedullah petitions for review of a decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Obedullah, a native of Afghanistan, entered the United States in May 2008 as a 
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nonimmigrant visitor.  In March 2009, he was charged as removable for overstaying his 
admission period and failing to comply with the conditions of his nonimmigrant status.  
He conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  He asserted that he would be persecuted 
in Afghanistan based on his father’s military history and opposition to the Taliban.  After 
a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief after finding Obedullah not credible.  
Obedullah filed an appeal and a motion to remand. 
 The BIA dismissed Obedullah’s appeal.  It found no clear error in the IJ’s adverse 
credibility finding and concluded that Obedullah had not met his burden to establish 
eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal.  A.R. at 5.  As for the motion to remand, 
the BIA determined that Obedullah had not shown that the evidence he submitted was not 
previously available or would change the outcome of his case.  Obedullah filed a timely 
petition for review. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  To establish eligibility for asylum, 
Obedullah needed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.  See Wang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 2005).  To 
establish eligibility for withholding of removal, he needed to demonstrate that it was 
more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened in Afghanistan on 
account of a protected ground.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).  To be eligible for withholding 
of removal under the Convention Against Torture, he needed to demonstrate that it is 
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more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to Afghanistan.  8 C.F.R. § 
1208.16(c)(2).  We may not reverse the BIA’s decision unless the record evidence would 
compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Obedullah had met his burden.  I.N.S. v. 
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).  We must uphold the adverse credibility 
finding unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.  Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen.
 Obedullah argues that the adverse credibility determination was not supported by 
substantial evidence.  First, he contends that the BIA wrongly concluded that he had 
omitted from his original declaration a significant incident in which he secured his 
father’s release from the Taliban.  However, the declaration he cites to in support of this 
argument is from his supplemental declaration.  His original declaration made no mention 
of the incident.  The BIA noted that: 
, 411 F. 3d 135, 153 (3d Cir. 2005). 
When asked to explain the omission, the respondent first stated that the 
person assisting him with his application would select the incidents for him.  
Later, he explained that he only remembered the incident when he 
completed his application, but that it was emotionally difficult to discuss.  
Later, he stated that there was only so much he could tell his attorney in 1-2 
hours. 
 
A.R. at 4 (citations omitted).  The BIA also noted that Obedullah’s father did not mention 
this incident in his affidavit.  The affidavit of Obedullah’s psychotherapist is not 
corroborative because it is not based on personal knowledge; she was merely relating 
what Obedullah told her.  The BIA did not err in relying on this omission in upholding 
the adverse credibility finding. 
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 Next, Obedullah contends that the BIA failed to properly consider his explanation 
for an inconsistency between his testimony and his written statement regarding whether 
he had ever been arrested.  The BIA observed: 
For instance, the respondent also stated in his 1-589 application that he had 
never been arrested. However, on direct, the respondent testified that he 
was arrested and detained when he was 8-years-old.  The respondent first 
explained the inconsistency by stating that he was only asked for 
information from the last ten-years, then he stated that his attorney told him 
he did not have to include every event, later he stated that he did not 
include the arrest because he was not “doing so well [emotionally]” in 
detention. 
 
A.R. at 4 (citations omitted).  Obdeullah points to statements by his psychotherapist and 
Naser Moborez as corroboration.  However, the psychotherapist merely states that 
Obedullah reported this incident to her.  Moborez’s statement was submitted to the BIA 
with Obedullah’s motion to remand; it was not before the IJ.  Furthermore, Moborez does 
not state that he has any personal knowledge as to the incident, only that the attempts 
made against Obedullah and his family are common knowledge.  It was not improper for 
the BIA to rely on this inconsistency in upholding the adverse credibility finding.   
 Finally, Obedullah asserts that the BIA failed to meaningfully consider his post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in evaluating his credibility.  The BIA rejected 
Obedullah’s argument that the IJ failed to consider his PTSD.  A.R. at 4 n.2.   The IJ 
thoroughly summarized the testimony of the clinical social worker who evaluated 
Obedullah.  A.R. at 74-76.  In discussing the credibility determination, the IJ explicitly 
noted Obedullah’s testimony on cross-examination that some inconsistencies were 
5 
 
because events were “emotionally difficult” and he was “not doing well” in detention 
when he completed his application.  A.R. at 82. 
 Obedullah argues that the BIA failed to consider the attempts his counsel made to 
have his witnesses testify telephonically from the embassy in Afghanistan.  However, in 
his brief before the BIA, Obedullah admitted that the IJ stated that while it would be 
optimal if the witnesses testified from the embassy, Obedullah could let the IJ know if 
that was an impossibility.  She indicated that she would still listen to the witnesses 
telephonically but would need to know why they could not go to the embassy.  App. at 
30-31.  The BIA noted the IJ’s observation that Obedullah was in contact with his father 
and could have reasonably arranged to have him testify telephonically. 
 Obedullah also challenges the BIA’s determination that he failed to supply 
corroborating evidence.  He also contends that the BIA did not discuss the corroborating 
evidence that he submitted.  He asserts that he submitted documents from the President of 
Afghanistan, a Governor, and a member of the Ministry of the Interior.   
 The IJ noted that Obedullah had submitted several letters concerning his father’s 
position in the military and his fighting against the Taliban.  She determined that these 
documents were unreliable and noted that Obedullah had not presented his father for 
telephonic testimony.  A.R. at 78-79.  The IJ gave the documents minimal weight because 
they were unauthenticated, obtained solely for the purpose of the hearing, and the authors 
were not subject to cross-examination.   Moreover, the IJ concluded that this evidence did 
not establish that the Taliban persecutes family members of military figures.  As noted by 
6 
 
the IJ, Obedullah admitted that his siblings, wife, and other family have lived in 
Afghanistan unharmed.  A.R at 87.     
 After upholding the adverse credibility finding, the BIA concluded that Obedullah 
could not carry his burden of proof without credible evidence.  After agreeing with the IJ 
that Obedullah had not met his burden on his claims for relief, the BIA noted that it need 
not reach Obedullah’s remaining arguments.  We have previously explained that the BIA 
is not required to “write an exegesis on every contention.  What is required is merely that 
it consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a 
reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.”  Filja v. 
Gonzales
 With respect to the motion to remand, Obedullah argues that the BIA refused to 
consider the entirety of the evidence submitted with the motion.   He challenges the 
BIA’s determination that evidence of his working for a company that provides assistance 
to the United States military would not change the outcome of his case.  A motion to 
remand is the functional equivalent of a motion to reopen.  
, 447 F.3d 241, 256 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  Obedullah has not shown 
that his evidence would compel a finding that he was credible or entitled to relief. 
Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 
F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of 
discretion.   Filja
 The BIA observed that Obedullah had not explained how the new evidence would 
change the IJ’s credibility determination.  A.R. at 6.  In his motion to remand, Obedullah 
simply stated that if the Taliban knew of his work, it would be an additional basis for 
, 447 F.3d at 251.    
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persecution.  However, he did not point to any evidence in the record supporting a claim 
that the Taliban targets those who have worked with the United States military.  As for 
the affidavit of Naser Moborez, the BIA noted that Obedullah had not presented any 
argument as to why the affidavit was not previously available except to state that 
Obedullah was not in contact with Moborez.  Obedullah contends that the BIA ignored 
other evidence submitted with the motion to remand; however, the BIA noted that 
Obedullah had submitted documents previously considered by the IJ.  Obedullah himself 
admitted in the motion to remand that the documents had already been submitted.  
Obeduallah has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to 
remand.   
 For the reasons above, we will deny the petition for review. 
